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THE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW UNIVERSITIES 
CAPTURE, MANAGE, AND MONETIZE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND WHY IT MATTERS, by Jacob Rooksby, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2016. 392 pp., Hardcover, $29.95. 
 
Reviewed by Liza Vertinsky 
Emory University School of Law 
lvertin@emory.edu 
 
American research universities faced with intensifying economic pressures are 
being forced to compete with increasing vigor in a variety of different but closely 
related academic marketplaces. These universities are competing for students and 
the tuition dollars they bring; “star” faculty and the intellectual and reputational 
capital they might generate; federal, state and local government support; and 
industry funds and private philanthropy. For those universities with large medical 
centers there is additional competition for patients and the revenues they generate. 
The result of this heightened competition for resources has been an increasing 
market-like approach to the functions of the university. In a world in which 
students have a growing number of choices over what, how, and where to study, 
universities are adopting a service provider mentality that focuses on the student 
as customer. They are investing heavily in distinguishing their brand and in 
cultivating the services they believe students will find attractive. As a former 
comfortable reliance on government support is overshadowed by concerns over 
how to capture a share of the shrinking pools of government funds, universities 
are increasingly positioning themselves as drivers of economic development. 
Robust technology transfer efforts and flexible industry partnerships are used to 
lure the support of corporations, and a host of carefully tailored and branded 
university initiatives are designed to appeal to philanthropists.   
 
This changing regime in higher education has been aptly termed “academic 
capitalism”.1 In their efforts to compete for funds from external resource 
providers in these various marketplaces, universities are modifying their 
traditional functions of public knowledge production and dissemination to 
integrate more commercially-oriented pursuits. As part and parcel of this process 
of competition for resources, different constituents within the university are 
forced to find ways of measuring and demonstrating their value – often in 
quantifiable economic terms. Intellectual property plays diverse and increasingly 
important roles in all of these pursuits, providing mechanisms for protecting and 
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exploiting university brands, facilitating technology transfer, and extracting 
commercial value from the content of new and in many cases digitalized 
educational programs. University administrators now see the cultivation of 
intellectual assets as an opportunity to both measure value as well as to generate 
further (economic) value. Administrations are often pressed to utilize different 
aspects of shared resources, such as the use of university branding to attract 
students on the one hand and to generate licensing revenue on the other.   
 
Jacob Rooksby’s book, THE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND provides 
a timely and comprehensive examination of the intersections between different 
forms of intellectual property and the pursuits, interests, and objectives of 
different constituencies within the university as it competes in these academic 
marketplaces. Rooksby demonstrates how the expanded use of intellectual 
property is both a reflection of, and a contributor to, the changing nature of the 
university. He warns of the need to recalibrate university policies and strategies in 
response to these changes to ensure that the accumulation and enforcement of 
private rights supports rather than subverts the university’s public goods mission. 
 
Rooksby’s study provides a valuable overview of intellectual property 
management within higher education, making the issues of intellectual property in 
this context accessible in ways that allow people unfamiliar with this area of law 
to grapple with the challenging policy issues that underlie it. He begins the book 
by providing an interesting and accessible primer on the types of intellectual 
property that come into play in the modern American research university. He 
takes the time to separate out the different types of intellectual property – 
trademark, patent, trade secret, and copyright- and the roles that each plays within 
the university. Armed with this working knowledge, the reader is then invited to 
consider the tensions between public and private aspects of knowledge creation, 
dissemination, and use that are inherent in the ways that universities are choosing 
to capture, manage and exploit these intellectual assets.    
 
The important role of university branding in the intensifying competition for 
resources makes trademark law a natural starting point. Rooksby suggests that the 
university brand “represents a negotiated identity, and colleges and universities in 
fierce competition with one another sense that they cannot risk being complacent 
in matters involving self-identification and self-promotion” (p. 5). He highlights 
the intertwined nature of university brands and trademark law and documents 
what he terms the phenomenon of “trademark-rights accretion” as well as the 
proliferation of domain names registered by universities. After investing heavily 
in their brands, universities naturally turn to the opportunities afforded by 
commercializing them. Often different groups within the university’s central 
administration are charged with these different aspects of brand, sometimes in 
communication with each other--though sometimes not--each pursuing 
commodification of some aspect of the university identity. Rooksby warns that 
expansive commercialization of the university brand can jeopardize public-
interest aspects of higher education.    
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University patenting activities provide another frontier in which the boundaries 
between publicly accessible knowledge and private rights are being redrawn.  
Since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980,2 universities have increasingly 
engaged in efforts to patent and license their technologies and inventions 
developed on campus. Indeed, a new profession of technology transfer 
professionals has arisen, which fuels the growth of this academic industry. More 
recently government pressure on universities to demonstrate their economic value 
has intensified pressures to produce measurable economic outcomes, if only in the 
form of inventions patented, licenses issued, or start-up companies launched. 
Universities are showing up more and more often in once unfamiliar terrains in 
their pursuit of patent-generated revenues, such as on the doorsteps of the 
courthouse to sue for patent infringement or in negotiations with patent assertion 
entities to monetize unlicensed patents. For example, in the aftermath of a very 
public patent dispute between two leading research universities over path-
breaking CRISPR technology, both parties quickly turned their attention to the 
business of managing the CRISPR technology through a series of partnerships 
with private entities that promised millions of dollars in return. In doing so, these 
universities are testing the boundaries between a non-profit research institution 
and a for-profit corporation in ways that are becoming increasingly common.   
 
Copyright issues have traditionally dominated debates over public access to 
publications. However, the new frontier of challenges in this domain lies in the 
shift towards on-line education, where ownership of the content becomes a more 
integral part of the business model of the university, and rights formerly left either 
implicitly or explicitly to professors now become university property. Even 
students are not immune from the reach of many university intellectual property 
policies.   
 
The conflicts that Rooksby identifies in the intellectual property sphere both 
manifest and impact broader trends in American higher education, and his views 
are an important contribution to this conversation about the future of universities.  
The concerns that he expresses over what he argues is an over-protection of 
intellectual property are a natural result of the embrace of a more corporate-like 
model of the university, one that prioritizes increased efficiency and the ability to 
generate outcomes that have measureable economic value. This shift towards a 
business mindset is not limited to intellectual property but rather pervades all 
domains of intellectual production. However, it is the legal structures put in place 
to facilitate technology transfer and the commercial potential of the university’s 
intellectual assets that make intellectual property a natural focus of business 
expansion.  
 
Where universities increasingly behave like private corporations in their use and 
defense of intellectual property, Rooksby rightly focuses attention on the risks to 
the public knowledge mission of the university. He argues that risks arise, not 
from the ability to harness intellectual property, but rather from the operational 
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and policy decisions of higher education institutions operating in an increasingly 
business-oriented and now financially challenging world. The ability to balance 
technology commercialization with the public creation and dissemination of 
knowledge is essential to the healthy university, and yet there are no clear 
guidelines and little consensus as to what that balance should be or how to 
achieve it.   
 
The evolution of university intellectual property policies that focus on 
commercialization of research and education are also reflective of the rise of the 
administrative-university, with its commodification of the process of knowledge 
production and dissemination and its focus on efficiency, assessment of 
measurable outcomes, and attention to the satisfaction of stakeholder interests. 
One of the dangers of the current trend towards measurement and assessment in 
economic terms is the disadvantaging of types of knowledge and knowledge 
production that are of significant public value but nonetheless evade 
quantification. In pursuit only of the measurable and the measured we jeopardize 
areas of intellectual production that are essential to the public knowledge mission 
of the university.   
 
After documenting the tensions between private rights and the public goods 
nature of the university that arise from what he argues is the over-protection and 
over-commercialization of university intellectual property, Rooksby goes on to 
suggest how universities might begin to recalibrate the balance between private 
rights and the public good. He supports a more limited approach to the 
accumulation and use of trademarks, advances proposals that would pull 
universities farther away from competitive patent market practices, and argues for 
a more circumscribed approach to copyright ownership. Perhaps more 
importantly, he advocates for a reframing of how universities understand their 
intellectual property issues, suggesting that intellectual property decisions should 
not be regarded as routine decisions left to business or legal administrators, but 
rather deserve full-scale treatment as core academic issues. He concludes that 
universities must recognize that “intellectual property policies and activities go to 
the heart of higher education’s existence in the public sphere as primarily an 
academic institution, not a corporate or a bureaucratic entity” (p. 283). 
 
While I agree that some kind of recalibration of university intellectual property 
policies is needed, I do suggest a note of caution in framing the debate around a 
rebalancing of private rights and the public good for several reasons. First, this 
seems to presume that different stakeholders agree that the university has a public 
goods mission and, furthermore, that they can reach agreement on what the public 
good is. Universities have always been contested spaces and will continue to be 
so, as different constituencies bring their own views as to what the mission of the 
university should be, what the public good consists of, and what processes will 
best promote this public good. Second, we should also consider the changing 
structure of the economy within which the university is situated and the changes 
that might be needed to ensure the sustainability of the university of the future. 
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The cost of university education has become unsustainable for the majority of 
students, many of whom find it impossible to get jobs upon graduation that pay 
enough to cover their growing financial investment in higher education. 
Universities have adopted research practices that presume a steady flow of 
government grant funding that can no longer be assured. Academic marketplaces 
are crowded with a large range of alternative providers of both research and 
educational programs, all competing for resources that universities once took for 
granted. We cannot ignore the very real economic and political constraints under 
which current universities must operate, and thus need to evaluate intellectual 
property practices with these constraints in mind.    
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, Rooksby’s message is an important one. “As the 
United States moves further towards an information and knowledge-based 
economy,” he tells us, “the impetus to lay claim to intangible outputs is 
increasing” (p. 255). Universities, as originators of much of this production, face 
critical decisions about when to amass private rights in knowledge and about how 
to manage these private rights for the public good. It is essential for them to 
preserve their “fundamental value and historic orientation towards the public” by 
putting into place practices that ensure private rights are used for the public good. 
 
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM: POLITICS, 
POLICIES, AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997). 
2 Bay-Dole Act of 1980 (Patent Rights in Inventions Made with Federal Assistance) 
35 U.S.C. §§ 200 et seq. 
 
© 2018 Liza Vertinsky 
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ARTISTIC LICENSE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF 
COPYRIGHT AND APPROPRIATION, by Darren Hudson Hick. University 
of Chicago Press, 2017. 240 pp., soft cover, $30.00. 
 
ILLEGAL LITERATURE: TOWARD A DISRUPTIVE CREATIVITY, by 
David S. Roh. University of Minnesota Press, 2015, 200 pp., soft cover, $25.00. 
 
Reviewed by Shubha Ghosh 
Syracuse University College of Law  
sghosh01@law.syr.edu 
 
Debates over intellectual property challenge the autonomy of law and attract the 
perspective of other academic disciplines. Two books by Professors Hick and 
Roh—ARTISTIC LICENSE and ILLEGAL LITERATURE bring the insights of 
Philosophy and English, respectively, to bear on the byzantine tangles of 
copyright law and policy. Separately, each offers needed reinforcement for battles 
over legal reform. Together, the books are documentary evidence for moving 
beyond the boundaries of legal thinking, whatever that may mean.  
 
Hick and Roh both are engaging writers, embellishing their arguments with 
minimal use of disciplinary jargon but with a clear vision for the terms of the 
debate. Hick’s focus is on appropriation practices in the visual arts. His first 
chapter follows the call of the cover, reproducing, and thereby appropriating, 
Mick Haggerty’s “Mickey Mondrian,” a 1976 painting of a just-completed 
Mondrian, paint dripping onto the floor into a gloppy depiction of Mickey Mouse. 
Copyright, Hick argues, often appeals to the natural rights of the creator, here 
Disney, to punish such appropriation. But Hick makes the case, based on a theory 
of rights, for justified appropriation, a limit on the natural rights of the creator to 
support the expressive freedom of artists like Haggerty. Roh advocates for 
appropriation as well but in the literary, textual (as opposed to visual) realm.  Fan 
fiction is among his causes and is one example of what Roh calls a “disruptive 
textuality” and a “dialogic response to a creative call” (Roh, p. 127). While Hick 
speaks in terms of theories of rights, Roh speaks for a discursive culture steeped 
in digital technologies. Rights of appropriators check rights of authors, according 
to Hick. Appropriation is a multivalent dialogue, according to Roh.  
 
Though the two books are steeped in different disciplines, there is much in 
common. Both are making the case for openness in copyright, for liberating the 
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creative user from the grip of exclusive rights. Hick builds an argument in support 
of constrained natural rights for authors, the constraint being the need and rights 
of creative commentators. Whether this constraint in turn has roots in natural 
rights theory is a challenging question, but may be beside the point. There is a 
pragmatic turn to Hicks’ book, a shift from grounding authorial rights in the 
nature of the creative process to limiting those rights based on the practical needs 
of creators to comment and develop their own works. Appropriators seem to 
remain second-degree creators; they do not so much have rights but needs and 
desires to which authorial rights must give way. Admittedly, there is something 
unsatisfactory about this balance. Why should appropriators be second-degree 
creators? Why are the rights of appropriators not as grounded in natural reason as 
those of authors? Roh’s approach avoids these quandaries by framing the problem 
as one of cultural exchange rather than of rights. Creative users are part of the free 
exchange of texts; they are part of a dialogue that intellectual property law must 
acknowledge in order to realize its goals of promoting creativity. This dialogue is 
grounded in the practicalities of digital technology and the distribution networks 
and feedback dynamics such technology unleashes. Rights talk matters less for 
Roh than for Hick. Rather, technology facilitates interactions that exclusive rights 
should not deter. But, as with Hick, Roh reminds us that law must confront 
reality. 
 
Shared pragmatism leads to the second common feature of the two books: their 
implications for law as a discipline. Both use the language of law, as is evident 
from the respective titles. Hick’s use of the word “license” is double-edged. He is 
not referring to a grant from the owner but to the liberty taken by the appropriator 
in using the owner’s work. This license, while transgressive of legal rights, is 
justified, as Hick demonstrates. Similarly, the “illegal” literature that Roh refers to 
(fan fiction, parodies, open source software) is against the law while in favor of a 
digital culture. Law is the target of both books even though the respective authors 
draw on different disciplinary arsenals. It is the villain in their respective stories 
of appropriation and disruption. This attitude is particularly clear in Hick’s 
assessment of reforms to fair use proposed by leading legal scholars. “[T]his 
patchwork approach is insufficient for a problem that requires structural revision” 
(Hick, p. 173). Law is the structure to be dismantled and reconstructed, 
presumably using disciplinary tools that transgress and transcend law.  
 
This last point reveals the ultimate lesson of these two books. Law itself is a 
discipline, a set of practices, a way of thinking, and not an overbearing monolith. 
Lawyers represent clients who feel violated to pursue cases that seek to establish a 
particular legal rule. Judges consider these cases in ways that reflect their sense of 
legal order. Legislators in turn establish their own sense of order counter to or 
reinforcing what judges have imposed. Add in the work of legal scholars, who 
seemingly try to make sense of all the pieces. These actors, however, are also 
disruptive, working against traditions and entrenched interests. They each operate 
within a certain discipline, which accrete into what a previous generation might 
have unselfconsciously called legal process. Critics of law like Hick and Roh 
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bring their own discipline into the mix to alter the seemingly placid and 
unchanging universe of law. As these books demonstrate, they do so at the risk of 
ignoring law’s own discipline.  
 
Martijn Konings’ exegesis on Michel Foucault and “disciplinary governance” is 
relevant here.1 As Konings describes, Michel Foucault’s “work was an argument 
for displacement of sovereign power by the disciplinary effects of discursive 
norms and epistemic techniques, and critique of theoretical perspectives that 
reproduced the illusions of sovereignty.”2 But, as Konings emphasizes, state 
agency continues on even against the discursive practices of disciplinary 
governance. Foucault’s late lectures at the College of France reintroduce 
sovereignty “as a configuration of incessant transactions which modify, or move, 
or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of investment, 
decision-making centers, forms and types of control.”3 The discipline of law 
operates at the intersection of disciplinary governance and sovereignty. Cross-
disciplinary takes on law, such as the ones here by Hick and Roh, often ignore 
law as a discipline, but at a peril to intellectual and political engagement.  
 
What is at stake in ignoring the discipline of law is losing sight of the political and 
economic interests that drive the practice of law. Both Hick and Roh tacitly 
understand the play of these interests. Hick recognizes them in the dominance of 
prominent artists in the art world; Roh, in the dynamics of the publishing industry 
and the censorious role of copyright. Yet, what is missing is a compelling 
confrontation with these interests. Instead, the authors seem to find solace in their 
own disciplinary customs. Their insights reveal cracks and offer a vocabulary and 
grammar for guiding reform. However, the fear remains that the political and 
economic interests will nonetheless win. Discipline serves to establish an order 
with the slim hope of transforming it. 
 
Some may read this argument as a call to develop a different disciplinary 
approach to law. Perhaps the tools of Economics and Political Science have more 
to offer than Philosophy and English to the disciplinary debate. The point, 
however, is not about the right tools. More knowledge does not necessarily lead to 
better understanding or better practices. Authors like Hick and Roh help in 
enlivening a debate. They are engaging and stimulating to read; their ideas are 
seeds for hearty discussion. Real change, however, can spring from scholarship 
only when discipline ceases to be confining and instead unleashes a flourishing of 
engagement with reimagining and refashioning the order we take for granted.  
 
Hick and Roh offer disciplinary perspectives, much of which is original and fresh. 
While I am skeptical of whether their perspectives offer a basis for actual reform, 
their books do challenge readers to think outside the borders of law’s discipline 
even as those borders may only become further ingrained. And, perhaps, one day 
we might look up from whatever book we happen to be engrossed in, whatever 
discipline we may be practicing, and see the world has changed. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Martijn Konings, CAPITAL AND TIME: FOR A NEW CRITIQUE OF 
NEOLIBERAL REASON, at 62 (Stanford University Press, 2018). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 65, citing Michel Foucault, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, at 72 
(Palgrave, 2008) (English translation of 1979 lectures). 
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THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRADEMARK TRANSACTIONS: A 
GLOBAL AND LOCAL OUTLOOK, edited by Irene Calboli & Jacques de 
Werra. Elgar, 2016. 617 pp., Hardcover, $310.00 
Reviewed by Jake Linford 
Florida State University College of Law 
jlinford@law.fsu.edu  
Properly calibrating trademark protection requires encouraging the mark owner to 
use the mark to send consistent signals about source and quality through the medium 
of the mark. Too little trademark protection can discourage the creation of source 
signifying meaning and externalize search costs on to consumers. Too much 
trademark protection can raise barriers to entry against potential competitors. None 
of this meaning making and source signifying occurs in a vacuum. A well-tuned 
trademark regime must account for how consumers use trademarks to economize 
search costs (and how those consumers repurpose the mark). A trademark regime 
that ignores consumer perception will at best accidentally facilitate consumer 
welfare on those occasions when a court reaches a result favoring the litigating party 
whose interests align most closely with the largest proportion of consumers.1  
When a trademark changes hands, there is a danger that consumers accustomed to 
the mark will be confused or deceived by the transfer. If one has become 
accustomed, for example, to the features of the Hostess snack cake, one might be 
disappointed if a new firm purchases the old Hostess marks but somehow fails to 
obtain old recipes, machinery, connections with ingredient sources, and the other 
essential elements that make a Twinkie a TWINKIE®.2 Indeed, trademark law in the 
United States once barred assignments of trademark rights in most cases out of 
concern that an assignment could not help but deceive consumers, unless the 
assignee obtained the assignor’s entire business lock stock and barrel. Licensing 
relationships were likewise forbidden, due to the harm anticipated if the licensee 
wasn’t using the licensor’s physical facilities to produce its mark-bearing goods. 
Those bars on assignments and licensing have been relaxed, internationally as well 
as in the U.S. International rules for trademark transactions are the topic of a recent 
volume edited by Irene Calboli and Jacques de Werra, THE LAW AND PRACTICE 
OF TRADEMARK TRANSACTIONS.  
Overall, this book highlights the ongoing propertization of trademarks, a process that 
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unfortunately is somewhat divorced from what many courts and scholars identify as 
the raison d’être of trademark protection: ensuring the use of the mark to inform 
consumers about the source and quality of mark-bearing products, and enabling 
consumers to rely on that mark to economize search costs. This review cannot 
capture the rich accounts of trademark transactions made by the chapters in this 
volume. Indeed, unlike the review of a book written by a single author, the 
multiplicity of voices makes impossible an exhaustive treatment of the various topics 
covered. But I provide a few highlights, with an eye toward how consumers might 
respond to trademark transfers and related transactions. 
The book is organized into two major parts. The first thirteen chapters of the volume 
lay out general principles governing trademark transactions, organized into four 
sections. The first section provides a general international framework for trademark 
transactions with chapters by Daniel Gervais3 and Marcus Höpperger.4 The second 
section discusses strategic considerations. Chapters include Jane Ginsburg’s 
discussion of how copyrighted works become trademarks and vice versa;5 Cédric 
Manara’s analysis of transactions for domain names;6 a chapter from Gregor Bühler 
and Luca Dal Malin on how trademark portfolios are split between two or more 
owners;7 and Shubha Ghosh’s insightful discussion of the competition issues 
implicated by trademark protection in comparison with other intellectual property 
regimes.8 A third section considers how trademarks are valued. Roy D’Souza 
discusses trademarks as a target for acquisition.9 Jean-Frédéric Maraia explains tax 
strategies for trademark transfers.10 Robert Burrell and Michael Handler expound 
how competing trademark and securities registries complicate secured interests in 
trademarks in Australia.11 Xuan-Thao Nguyen describes uncertainties that plague 
licensing agreements when the licensor declares bankruptcy.12 A final section 
discusses alternative dispute resolution and settlement mechanisms. Neil Wilkof 
examines the benefits and drawbacks of trademark consent agreements, which allow 
potentially confusing marks to coexist in the market.13 Dai Yokomizo reviews 
international choice of law rules.14 Jacques de Werra considers alternatives to 
litigation for solving trademark disputes, focusing on mediation, the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Procedure for transferring rights in trademark-related domain 
names, and arbitration.15 
The second half of the book offers chapters that are regionally or nationally focused. 
Martin Senftleben describes trademark transactions in the EU.16 Laura Anderson 
considers those transactions under the UK’s relatively liberal approach.17 Axel 
Nordemann and Christian Czychowski describe how the German trademark system 
has shifted in a pro-transaction direction.18 Nicholas Binctin discusses how the 
French concept of fonds de commerce – those physical and intangible elements that 
enable a merchant to engage in commerce – informs trademark transactions.19 Irene 
Calboli describes rapidly dwindling U.S. limits on assignment and licensing.20 José 
Carlos Vaz e Dias discusses Brazilian permutations.21 Finally, four chapters consider 
trademark transactions in Asia. He Guo discusses how the relatively new Chinese 
trademark regime handles transfers of trademark rights.22 Shinto Teramoto shares 
perspectives on a putative Japanese expansion of the right to transfer marks.23 
Susanna Leong compares trademark transaction rules among the member nations of 
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the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).24 Raman Mittal concludes the 
volume by discussing trademark transactions in India.25 
These chapters show how different regimes balance the need for private ordering 
against consumer protection when determining how much to encourage the transfer 
of rights in a trademark. My initial reference point for trademark transfers is the 
United States trademark regime. Historically, assignment or licensing stripped 
protection from the mark. Free alienation of trademarks is reasonably perceived as 
somewhat inconsistent with the dominant consumer protection rationale for 
trademark law (Calboli, Chpt. 18, pp. 440-41). Courts in the early part of the 20th 
century denied priority to assignees and licensees to avoid “a fraud on the 
purchasing public who reasonably assumes that the mark signifies the same thing, 
whether used by one person or another”26 (Calboli, p. 444, n.26). I pause here to note 
the peculiar circumstance created when addressing assignment in gross and licensing 
without control by deeming the mark forfeited. That remedy leaves those same 
consumers the law sought to protect from the fraud perpetrated by assignment in 
gross or naked licensing to suffer a similar fate at the hands of an appropriator whose 
relationship to the former mark owner is even more tenuous, or in fact nonexistent.27  
While the consequences of making the wrong sort of assignment or carelessly 
licensing a mark remain grave, the requirements for valid transfers and licenses have 
been relaxed. Courts no longer expect consistency with regard to physical source. A 
mark may be assigned without elements of the associated business like the physical 
plant, machinery used to make the product, connections with suppliers, or employee 
know-how (Calboli, p. 442). Indeed, the TRIPS agreement forbids member countries 
like the U.S. from requiring the mark be sold with the underlying business (Calboli, 
pp. 446-47). U.S. courts now require only that the mark is assigned with its 
underlying goodwill. Unfortunately, defining goodwill is a challenge (Calboli, p. 
446). The modern U.S. rule has thus relaxed requirements for assignments in a way 
that leads to significant potential uncertainty for assignees and licensees, while 
simultaneously failing to account for consumer perception and protection. 
One might hope that the inquiry into goodwill might consider how consumers 
respond or are likely to respond to the assignment at issue, to properly balance the 
needs of consumers with the needs of assignors and assignees and competitors 
selling similar products. Courts attempt to approximate consumer perception in the 
assignment context by asking whether the assignee has access to the assignor’s 
physical or intangible resources (inputs) and whether the assignee’s goods or 
services are similar to those previously offered by the assignor under the mark 
(outputs). A mismatch can forfeit priority in the assigned mark. For example, in 
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grapette Co., the assignee’s use of the assignor’s mark Peppy for a 
cola-flavor beverage, when the assignor had used the mark only on a pepper-
flavored beverage, amounted to a fatal misalignment (Cf. Calboli, p. 445).28 More 
recent cases embrace a relatively relaxed standard, allowing the assignee to retain 
priority if the assignee’s goods are in the same relative product category, irrespective 
of differences in quality. For example, in Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Sultana Crackers, 
Inc., the court declined to hold that the assignee forfeited its priority when it offered 
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cigarette paper of a distinctly lower quality than that of assignor.29 
Assignment rules in the U.S. provide imperfect measures of consumer perception, 
but looking at both inputs and outputs is better suited to discover consumer opinion 
than the licensing rules, which look only at one type of input – the putative existence 
of a licensor’s quality control measures. Courts don’t always require actual exercise 
of control by licensors; the existence of a contractual provision allowing the licensor 
to exercise control is sometimes treated as sufficient evidence that the licensee’s 
quality will match that of the licensor.30 What rises to a sufficient amount of quality 
control is ill defined, and thus cases are inconsistent on this point (Calboli, p. 454). 
Even more troubling, courts rarely consider actual differences in quality in the 
absence of quality control measures. For example, in Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick 
Enterprises, Inc.,31 the licensor forfeited its ability to rein in a runaway licensee 
based on the lack of quality control, even though there was no evidence of confusion 
or inconsistency as to quality. Indeed, the licensees were relatives of the licensor, 
and the stores shared the same dress designer.32 
For firms with international trademark portfolios, or firms looking to purchase or 
license a mark used internationally, there is a general shift in the direction of freer 
transfer and licensing of trademarks, but there is as yet no harmonization. Some 
regimes are quite permissive. For example, the UK regime takes freedom of contract 
as a foundational principle (Anderson, Chpt. 15, p. 359). Such a focus results in 
relatively permissive rules about assignment or licensing. For instance, well-known 
fashion designer Elizabeth Emanuel sold off her company, which kept using her 
name as the mark. The Court of Justice held that even though consumers might 
reasonably conclude that Emanuel was still involved in designing the marked 
product, that mistake on the part of consumers did not rise to a level of deceit 
sufficient to invalidate the transfer (Anderson, p. 362).33 Similarly, in a licensing 
case, Scandecor Development AB v. Scandecor Marketing AB, the House of Lords 
ruled that licensing without licensor control is not inherently deceptive (Anderson, p. 
375-76).34 Singapore is similarly liberal in its approach to assignment, moreso than 
other ASEAN members (Leong, Chpt. 22, p. 542). 
Other regimes have different mechanisms to police problematic transfers, with at 
least an eye toward preventing consumer deception or confusion. For example, the 
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, an agency of the European 
Community, will refuse to register a Community trade mark (CTM) – which would 
otherwise qualify for protection throughout the European single market – if the CTM 
is likely to mislead the public with regard to the “nature, quality, or geographical 
origin of the goods or services for which it is registered” (Senftleben, Chpt. 14, pp. 
329). The Philippines also rejects assignments found likely to mislead the public, 
due to inconsistencies between the products of assignor and assignee, with regard to 
“nature, source, manufacturing process, characteristics, or suitability for … purpose” 
(Leong, p. 543). 
States also bring different tools to bear to discourage licensing without control. 
Some states, like India, use multiple mechanisms. The licensee’s right to use the 
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mark may be questioned. In addition, the licensor may forfeit the mark due to 
genericness or misuse. The licensor may even be responsible faulty or injurious 
products pursuant to a product liability claim (Mittal, Chpt. 23, pp. 571-72). 
States also adopt unique solutions to notify consumers of shifting ownership. For 
example, in Malaysia, another ASEAN member, the assignee must advertise the 
assignment to notify consumers of the new relationship (Leong, p. 543). Other 
regimes instead use mandatory recordation with the national trademark or patent 
office to provide notice to interested third parties. For instance, a license is 
unenforceable in Japan against non-contracting parties until it is registered with the 
Japan[ese] Patent Office (Teramoto, Chpt. 21, p. 532). Similarly, a license in China 
becomes binding on third parties only upon recordation with the Chinese Trademark 
Office (Guo, Chpt. 20, pp. 502-03). 
Mark owners will sometimes split off a portfolio of products sold under a given 
mark, while retaining a separate portfolio of products also sold under that mark. 
Splitting the market will frequently require the parties to clearly designate their 
respective rights. For example, if the priority in each subset of the portfolio stems 
back to a singular first use in commerce, then the parties may not be able to sort out 
their legal rights in a market through a standard priority inquiry. In such a case, the 
parties must necessarily contract around the conflict (Bühler & Dal Malin, Chpt. 5, 
pp. 103-04). Privately ordering the market in this way through some sort of 
coexistence deal leaves open the possibility that consumer confusion will follow in 
its wake (Wilkof, Chpt. 11, pp. 262, 269). Some regimes manage this risk by putting 
limits on the ability to split a market. For example, splitting markets is not permitted 
in China or Malaysia (Guo, p. 497; Leong, p. 543). Other states dictate how parties 
must handle split markets. For example, in Japan, the law recognizes that 
“simultaneous representations” may potentially confuse consumers, so one mark 
owner may be required to provide an extra indication or affixation with products 
sold in order to prevent confusion (Teramoto, pp. 532-33.) 
These international regimes provide a slightly different balance between rights to 
contract and consumer protection. Uncertainty leads to suboptimal guidance for 
firms with international portfolios. The editors of this volume predict an ongoing 
shift in the direction of greater harmony between the various national trademark 
transaction regimes. Harmonization has not yet arrived but the trend line clearly 
favors low restrictions and freer transactions.  
Advocates for more open transfer of trademarks might argue that consumer goodwill 
often lies fallow in the hands of a current mark owner due to inattentiveness or 
misuse, and repurposing or reappropriating the mark for which consumers feel 
nostalgia will certainly benefit those consumers, compared to the status quo. That 
depends in part on the approach of the firm appropriating a forfeited mark, 
purchasing a mark, or taking a license. Consumers can certainly be drawn to inactive 
or underutilized brands, and firms can capitalize by acquiring the mark and taking 
advantage of that pathway to consumer custom (D’Souza, Chpt. 7, p. 156). Some 
might wonder whether a failed brand can retain consumer goodwill, but the failure of 
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a firm as an ongoing concern cannot always be attributed to consumer disinterest. 
For example, Linens ‘n Things was dissolved as a going concern when its corporate 
operators aggressively leveraged the company. Brands fail in part due to 
“quantifiable economic factors as well as subjective factors such as public 
perception” (D’Souza, p. 159).  
Appropriations of inactive marks can also raise barriers to entry, compared to a 
situation where the abandoned mark has not yet been appropriated. For example, 
when Borders declared bankruptcy, Barnes & Noble bought the trade names and 
intellectual property of its now defunct competitor. Why purchase those marks? 
Likely with an eye to preventing a new entrant from rebranding Borders and 
enjoying an accelerated development of goodwill by capitalizing on consumer 
interest (D’Souza, pp. 158-59).  
As I have argued elsewhere, the U.S. regimes are too focused on the relationship 
between former and current mark owners, and between incumbents and new 
entrants, and focused too little on the relationship between the mark and the 
consumer.35 A properly aligned transfer regime would not only give lip service to 
the needs of consumers, but would also develop tools to measure whether consumers 
would benefit more from liberal transfer or some brakes on trademark alienation and 
licensing.36 Perhaps tools used to value intellectual property could be brought more 
directly to bear on how consumers value and use marks in the hands of assignees, 
licensees, or post-forfeiture appropriators (Cf. D’Souza, pp. 152-56). 
Calboli and de Werra take a decidedly agnostic approach to the correct balance 
between freedom of contract and the consumer protection, instead embracing a 
“diversity of opinions” with the goal of offering “a unique blend of doctrinal and 
critical interpretation of the rules related to trademark transactions” (Introduction, 
xxxi). They have reached and surpassed that goal: Those who hope for a streamlined 
summary of how trademark transactions operate in various national and international 
jurisdictions will find the volume worthwhile.  
I am, however, left with the impression that the volume would have benefitted from 
a normative capstone. It would admittedly be difficult to provide a unified theory to 
synchronize the varying approaches described in each chapter. Nonetheless, an 
attempt to articulate lessons that could be gleaned in light of varying justifications 
for trademark protection would have been a welcome addition to an otherwise 
successful endeavor. Perhaps this review will provide the reader with a useful – if 
slightly critical and altogether too brief – summation of the field of trademark 
transactions.  
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